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The most successful bioprospecting venture was established in 1989 in Costa Rica. Interestingly, the distinction of being
a forerunner in exploiting bioprospecting goes to India. In 1979, a full decade before Costa Rica, India established the
Tropical Botanic Garden and Research Institute (TBGRI) at Trivandrum. Yet, the TBGRI venture with the Kani tribes,
which had the potential to become a beacon of bioprospecting success, is showcased as the exemplar of failure. In this era of
trade regime, this paper asserts, bioprospecting ventures are important tools for developing countries. Countries like India
and organizations like TBGRI should learn from their failures and take leadership roles to evolve techniques to maximize
returns by using biodiversity resources. With this as the background, this paper propounds three theoretical models for
assigning bio-value to biotechnology products.
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Those who cannot learn from History are condemned
to repeat it.1 Those who fail to negotiate are
condemned by History.
The biggest achievement of the 20th Century is the
expansion of the scope of property rights to
accommodate intangible property, which in turn,
facilitated a set of remarkable negotiations that altered
the structure of international trade to facilitate
globalization. 2 Ironically, though, the debate on trade
and IP rights gained significance not because of the
trade facilitated but because of the trade distorted
from matters excluded from intellectual property (IP)
regime. Harmonized laws, crafted solution to reduce
international trade distortions, have resulted in
minimum standards that force maximum levels of
protection.
Nevertheless, nations differ on the question of what
to protect as IP and how to protect IP .3 Partly, the
differences in the treatment of IP rights are
attributable to a lack of clarity regarding the subject
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matter eligible for IP protection (as opposed to the
rights they embody). For instance, protection status
for certain properties like genetic (biodiversity)
resources recognized in the non-western parts of the
globe has at best, remained moot. Developing nations
have struggled to appreciate refusal by the modern
western paradigm of property that fervently celebrates
IP, to treat contributions that enable creation of such
property, genetic resources, as a part of IP.
Consequently, this era has also seen a push towards
global recognition of newer forms of intellectual
property right (IPR).
Yet, it is important to remember that developing
nations have traditionally been suspicious of IP
and indeed, would likely benefit from moderate
rather than excessive IP protection. After all, in
developing nations, like India and Brazil, IP laws
historically played a limited role. Considering this
factum, the reason why developing countries want IP
to embrace genetic resources is unclear. If the goal is
to create a return for local resources, holders of
genetic resources do not necessarily require IP as a
basic tool to structure a return regime for genetic
resources. Developing nations should, instead,
formulate innovative, alternative, effective tools that
protect local resources. The objective of this work is
to analyse instruments that developing countries
can successfully use to create returns on local
biodiversity resources.
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Of Enablers & the Enabled
Between prospecting and applying technology,
importance of biogenetic resources cannot be
discounted. Technology, development and research
are also important paradigms, but they are already
well-recognized aspects of bio-prospecting. It is the
bio-paradigm that cries of prospecting on the one
hand and pirating on the other. The following
discussion examines the bio paradigm of
biotechnology in an effort to highlight a case for
creating a value for biodiversity.
Bio-Prospecting & Biodiversity

Bio-prospecting
involves
exploration
of
biodiversity for biological resource.4 Biodiversity is
explored or prospected to determine whether parts of
it can be useful to mankind. The term biodiversity
encompasses, ‘the variability among living organisms
from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial,
marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the
ecological complexes of which they are part; this
includes diversity within species, between species and
of ecosystems’.5 A dozen countries, including Brazil,
Colombia,
Ecuador,
Peru,
Mexico,
Zaire,
Madagascar, Australia, China, India, Indonesia and
Malaysia, are mega diversity countries ripe for bioprospecting. 5 These countries account for 60 to 70
percent of the world’s biodiversity. 6
Modus of Bio-Prospecting

Bio-prospecting is a three step process. Step one
involves exploration, extraction and screening of
biological diversity. Bio-prospectors collect plants
and other organisms for testing bioactivity in
exchange for a licensee fee.6 Collection involves the
process of removing a specimen of identified species
from its natural surroundings.6 Typically, numerous
sample collections are identified and examined before
identifying the right plant or chemical. Once a
researcher identifies a plant with its medicinal
properties, the collected plants and organisms are
processed and their bioactivity tested. 7 Step two
involves experimentation, appreciation of the
resources and understanding the prevailing traditional
knowledge over the resources. Step three involves
using knowledge database over biological diversity
from research and traditional sources, to create
commercially valuable genetic and biochemical
resources.7 On an average, only one in about 10,000
chemicals derived from the mass screening of plants,
animals and microbes results in a potentially
profitable drug. 8 For example, the United States
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National Cancer Institute screened over 35,000 plants
and organisms for anti-cancer compounds between
1956 and 1976. 9 The programme was terminated in
1981 due to its failure to identify a greater number of
new anti-cancer agents.9 Thus, prospecting is a
rigorous process with no guarantee of successful
results.
Issues from Bio-Prospecting

Protection of biodiversity in the wake of bioprospecting raises multifaceted issues that could
affect several future generations. First, bioprospectors assert that they merely scout for natural
genetic material4 in the biological resource, which
should be freely available. Biodiversity holders assert
that traditional knowledge plays a role in improving
the success rate for biotechnology by directing
researchers towards particular chemicals in herbs,
thus reducing the number of plants screened. The
problem becomes exacerbated when the ultimate endproduct of the research over the genetic material, is
protected by IP rights and commercialized. Often, the
IP rights over the product prevent the local
communities from accessing it. At that point, local
communities feel undermined and exploited.
Second, bio-prospecting is touted as an incentive
for developing nations to preserve biodiversity while
enhancing biotechnology. 10 The payment made for the
right to access biodiversity is showcased as the
incentive for developing countries to preserve their
flora and fauna.6 Developing countries dismiss the
argument on the grounds that the payment levels are
meager, especially when viewed in the light of the
multi-billion dollar rewards that pharmaceutical
companies reap.11 Additionally, the payment made to
the community or the governments in return for
prospecting rarely results in the community protecting
biodiversity. 6 Most of these communities are
impoverished and lack basic facilities like food and
transportation. 12 These communities are rightfully
more likely to use the money for their community
development. Furthermore, few countries with natural
resources have national laws mandating restoration of
areas depleted by bio-prospecting. For example,
environmental protection is a Constitutional guarantee
in India.13 The Directive Principles of the Constitution
mandates policies to ‘protect and improve
environment and to safeguard forests and wildlife of
the country’.14 Despite, separate legislations
protecting wildlife and forestry,15 until 2000, not a
single piece of legislation addressed replenishing the
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flora and fauna lost from bio-prospecting.16 Even the
Indian Biodiversity Act of 2002 is arguably a
defensive policy primarily addressed for equitable
sharing of benefits from bio-prospecting.
Third, bio-prospecting, being a process of
extracting valuable chemicals from natural products,
impacts the bio-equilibrium of the environment
directly and indirectly. The discovery of chemicals
with medicinal properties, in particular, varieties of
plants, reduces the interest in the preservation of
‘ordinary plants’ for both the bio-prospectors and the
communities. Consequently, both holder and
prospector parties prefer cultivating particular plants
with identified chemicals to reap maximum
commercial benefits. Any strategic cultivation or
protection of plants will be targeted to profitable
varieties. In most cases, other plants, including flora
and fauna with as yet undiscovered properties, are
destroyed. The agreement of the TBGRI with the
Kani tribe in India, for instance, involved cultivation
of one particular plant in the forest (to which the
Indian forest department objected on the grounds that
it could destroy the natural habitat. 17 It is perhaps
impractical to assume that bio -prospecting nations
and corporate houses using plant extracts to make
potentially enormous profits will fund cultivation of
anything other than profit yielding varieties. They are
rarely concerned about aspects other than access to
genetic resources. Likewise, ‘access and benefitsharing arrangement’ negotiations rarely involve
preservation of biodiversity destroyed by bioprospecting. Unfortunately, biodiversity preservation
is independent of cancer curing and the other wonder
plants.6 Ordinary plants and habitats are essential for
the development of the wonder drugs. 6
Impact of the environment notwithstanding,
developing countries assert that biotechnology is a
form of agricultural industrialization that has
historically destroyed biodiversity by creating
monocultures divorced from ‘nature,’ with unintended
consequences such as soil erosion. 6,18 Supporters of
the
commercialization
theory
argue
that
biotechnology enhances agricultural productivity. 19
The bottom-line is that developing as well as
developed nations are seduced by the potential
payoffs from cultivating profit yielding plant
varieties.
Consequently,
there
is
rampant
commercialization of biodiversity powered by the
needs and creeds of both the developing and the
developed nations. Hence, developing countries

which are interested in exploiting their natural
resources should carefully determine best practices to
further commercialization without compromising
national objectives like biodiversity preservation.
Asymmetries and Current Trends in Bio propsecting Agreements
Structuring a viable solution for developing nations
requires an understanding of how the current system
works along with the benefits and disadvantages
involved therein. In practice, bio-prospecting
agreements tend to embody several asymmetrical
terms. An agreement tends to include asymmetrical
terms when parties posited in unequally bargaining
positions negotiate. The asymmetry can result from
extraneous factors such as poverty of the indigenous
communities, financial position of the prospector,
availability of low cost information about the use of
plants and the communities’ lack of information about
the profitability of the genetic material. The section
highlights two types of biodiversity agreements and
demonstrates the damages that an asymmetrical
biodiversity agreement can cause.
Agreements Ignoring Biodiversity

The first type of bioprospecting agreement pays the
community but ignores biodiversity preservation
completely and thus, fails the goals of the Convention
on Biological Diversity (CBD).5 For example, Shaman
Pharmaceuticals Inc, an Ame rican corporation, collects
plants for research after gathering information from
indigenous healers in the rain forests.20 The company
researches plants used for medicinal purposes by at
least three different communities.20 Approximately half
of the plants collected by Shaman's researchers return
positive results in screening test.21 Shaman
pharmaceuticals brought two products to clinical trials
within 24 months from using information about
tropical medicinal plant species from local people.20
The agreement between Shaman and the respective
communities address the needs of the community only.
The obligation of the community requires them to
supply information about plants but does not extend to
preserving biodiversity. 20 The agreement is
commendable for Shaman’s reciprocal arrangement
with the community, which is done in three stages –
short, medium and long term arrangements.22 But,
initiatives like providing infrastructure to the
community facilitate bioprospector’s access to plants
without fully creating a procedure for biodiversity
protection.
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Agreements Ignoring Community

Current Trends

The second type of agreement funds for
biodiversity preservation but excludes the community
that provides knowledge of plant’s medicinal
properties. 9,23 Such
agreements
ignore
the
communities’ role – after all, the communities’
cooperation and knowledge of plants are essential to
preserve and prevent destruction of biodiversity. Even
though this type of agreement provides for
biodiversity preservation, it fails in achieving the
objective because communities lacking the means for
daily bread cannot be expected to have the
commitment to channel scarce resources into
preserving environment. Furthermore, process of
prospecting is accelerated by local people’s awareness
of healing properties of plants which provide clues to
the possible chemical compounds.24 Agreements that
ignore community exploit naivety of indigenous
people to the benefit of the prospectors. They merely
provide incentives to commercialize biodiversity and
encourage continuous supply of chemical-yielding
plants to the bioprospector.

Developing nations that allow bio-prospecting
should use it to stimulate sustainable development.
Commitment towards biodiversity preservation and
local communities is the key to steer such agreements
towards fulfilling national sustainable development
goals. Costa Rica serves as a good example of a
country that uses bio-prospecting to attain sustainable
development.

The Merck-INBio accord provides a demonstration
of
an
agreement
prioritizing
biodiversity
preservation. 25 Merck, an American pharmaceutical
company entered into an exclusive agreement with
INBio of Costa Rica whereby the latter agreed to
provide chemical extracts from wild plants, insects,
and microorganisms exclusively for the former’s
drug-screening programmes.25 Conservation of
biological diversity is high on the agreement’s
priorities. The agreement obligates INBio to
contribute 10% of its upfront payment from Merck
and 50% of any future royalties to Costa Rica's
National Park Fund specifically for the purpose of
conserving biodiversity. 26 The primary asymmetry of
the Merck–InBio agreement is that indigenous
community of Costa Rica, whose knowledge is
heavily relied upon, receives very little from the
agreement. Application of knowledge of indigenous
societies is absolutely essential to derive maximum
benefit from biodiversity resources. Yet, indigenous
communities, who form a vital part of region’s
geographic diversity, receive secondary treatment.27
Merck uses locally trained people to locate valuable
genetic material but unfortunately pays them at local
rates. Using low-paid locals to facilitate agreements
with potential billion dollar payoffs to the
biopropsector remains an unacceptable feature of
bioprospecting arrangements.

When Merck & Co showed an interest to
bio-prospect, the government of Costa Rica set-up
INBio - Instituto Nacional de Biodiversidad. 28 INBio
is a nonprofit organization formed in 1989 to
preserve, scientifically classify, and effectively use
Costa Rica’s biodiversity towards sustainable
development.29 In establishing INBio and facilitating
the Merck arrangement, the government of Costa Rica
has exhibited a remarkable level of dedication
towards using biodiversity as a means for sustainable
development. In turn, experience has enhanced the
confidence, the national government to bargain terms
that benefit Costa Rica. For instance, INBio
negotiated a royalty of up to 3% of worldwide sales
on any drugs developed from the biological samples.30
The requirement that royalties be paid on worldwide
sales, rather than just sales in the US or Costa Rica,
will prevent Costa Ricans from paying royalties on
products developed from the INBio samples.29 The
world-wide royalty arrangement would help avoid
mistrust between the parties at a later stage of the
agreement. Should a blockbuster drug be developed
from the INBio samples, the resulting royalty
payments will greatly benefit Costa Rica. 30 In the
past, Merck had developed successful drugs from
biological samples like anti-parasitic veterinary drug,
Ivermectin (developed from a microorganism native
to Japanese soil)31 which generated $100 million in
sales in 1991. 30
Another notable term in the agreement requires the
samples be tested in Costa Rica, in contrast to other
biopropsecting arrangements where tests are
conducted at the prospector’s research facilities. 25,29
The local testing provision creates awareness in the
region about research progress and facilitates
equitable sharing of royalties. This equitable
arrangement has fostered an amiable and functioning
relationship between Merck and INBio, a highlight
which has been distinctly lacking in other
bioprospecting arrangements.31
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Under the agreement, Merck is also required to
establish a research facility and provide funds to
INBio to supply instruction to native scientists
and laboratory technicians.25,32 Although Merck has
invested only about $135,000 in laboratory
equipment33 and trained about 30 Costa Ricans,31
INBio has trained locals in parataxonomy to gather
samples for Merck.31 The parataxonomists are lay
persons, often from rural areas. 29 INBio’s training
helps them to collect, catalog, and provide data for
input into INBio’s National Biodiversity Inventory
and Information Management System. 29 Furthermore,
INBio retains control of the samples and databases
which can be used for future negotiations. Thus, the
government of Costa Rica has taken steps to help the
local communities.
The immense confidence that the government of
Costa Rica gained from its experience went a long
way in future negotiations. Thus, while renewing the
agreement in 1994, INBio successfully bargained for
more research funding, transfer of technology and
training opportunities for Costa Rican scientists at the
Merck facility in New Jersey. 29 Soon, Costa Rica also
enacted a Wildlife Conservation law allocating
responsibilities to specific agencies to negotiate
strategic bioprospecting agreements to benefit both
environment and economy. 29,33 Additionally, a
Biodiversity Prospecting Program coordinates highend tests at the University of Costa Rica to locate
compounds for Merck. 29
Unfortunately, not all developing countries even
should show minimum commitment exhibited by
Costa Rica towards biodiversity preservation and
sustainable development. For instance, Brazil’s
Association for the Sustainable Use of the
Biodiversity of Amazonia (BIOAMAZONIA)
negotiated a three-year bioprospecting agreement with
Novartis pharmaceuticals in return for $4 million and
a 1% royalty commitment from worldwide sales.29
Unlike the Merck-INBio, this agreement does not
require parties to use funds towards biodiversity
preservation, nor does the agreement provide
opportunities for Brazilian scientists.29
India’s effort in bio-prospecting is yet another
example of questionable commitment towards
bioprospecting. The story from India, a megadiversity country, involves the Kani tribe of Kerala
whose knowledge was used to create a drug called
Jeevani. 34 The highpoint of the agreement is to share
50% of the license and royalties with the tribe.34 The

low point is that the sharing was done more as a
charitable gesture in recognition of tribe’s
contribution without any policy or standardized
structure for doing the same. 34 The shameful aspect of
the agreement is the lo w royalty and license fee that
TBGRI seems to have negotiated with Arya Vaidya
Pharmacy (AVP), which is a private company. For
instance, reports suggest that each tribal family earned
merely about Rs. 8,000 on sale of leaves from the
cultivation of the T. zeylanicus plant.17 The Indian
government seems to lack reasonable guidelines for
such negotiations. For instance, it is unclear whether
and what component of the royalty is for imparting
knowledge about the plants (which is the most
important property transferred in this case) and for the
sale of the leaves. In fact, reports suggests that there
was a lack of clarity on what constituted the Kani
Tribe for a considerable period. 34 Similarly, there
seems to be no reasonable study to estimate or project
the drug’s market potential, nationally and
internationally. There is also no study discussing the
existing potential AVP to effectively position the drug
and whether the AVP would need more assistance to
fully capitalize on ventures in the future. The lack of a
uniform policy for such ventures reflects poorly on
the Indian government and the TBGRI.
The various discussions above go to outline that
ultimately, developing nations must realize that sustainable development can be achieved while simultaneously preserving biological diversity. Such a
realization can help countries to strategically use bioprospecting agreements to further objectives of CBD.
Valuation of Bio-Diversity Assets
The discussions above demonstrate that bioprospecting is a by-product of mutual agreement
between prospector and local communities or the
government, as the case is. It posits negotiations as
one key to success in bio-prospecting arrangements.
Thus, bargaining positions are central to determining
equities. The prospector seeks biodiversity material in
order to create biotechnology by-products. By virtue
of biotechnology assets being eligible for IP
protection, qualifying by-products of bio-prospecting
immediately generates a market value. In other words,
IP protected products automatically embody a certain
value and goodwill. Value is important because
property theories tend to be value based. Measured in
value terms, biodiversity’s value in being the holder
of the genetic material for use by prospectors cannot
be discounted. So, the question for developing nations
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should perhaps not be whether the genetic material is
an IP. Instead, the question is determining the value in
genetic materials – or, the bio value in biotechnology.
While IP remains one method of generating value,
countries need to realize that value can be generated
without IP too.
Value of any property is ultimately a measure of
need. Appreciating the extent of need is central to
generating maximum value over any property, real or
intellectual. Several so called ‘intellectual properties’
suffer in the market because it did not generate
adequate need in the market. Abandoned trademarks,
patents that are not renewed are all examples. In such
cases, although the respective intellectual property
offices may be arbiters of the existence of property, the
lack of market need prevented the product from
realizing its maximum value. Similarly, valuable IPs
that are not marketed, may also not generate its full
value. It goes to prove that a property has to be wellpositioned in the market to realize its full value from
the market need. Hence, merely granting a property
status or generating a value disconnected with need
also does not serve the objective of exploiting a
resource beneficially. Thus, equation requires the
holder of a property to work towards achieving twin
goals of generating value and measuring need. The
reliance of biotechnology over genetic materials creates
‘need’ and hence, generates a value for the genetic
materials. It is up to the biodiversity holder to
maximize upon the value during the course of
negotiations. The following discussion highlights some
models over which developing countries can further
build to maximize the value of biodiversity resources.
Prospect Based Model

The prospect model provides for two levels of
compensation. The first level provides for a base
compensation for access to genetic resources. At this
stage, need is marginal because complete information
about the materials is unavailable to the bioprospector. The second level of compensation is
dependent on the market success or failure of the bioprospecting venture relative to the extent of
involvement. The success of this level depends on the
extent of disclosure requirements that both parties
agree to make during the course of the agreement.
Thus, assuming the prospecting results in a drug that
yields 100% profits (relative to the investment made
for that particular prospecting operation – which
would, in essence discount regular employee costs
that are made generally by the corporation like regular
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employment related costs, etc.,), the bio-value of the
compound would depend on several factors like
importance of the bio-diversity resource for creating
the drug, information imparted by the community,
extent of effort by the prospector and type of
information generated, methodology of prospecting
and technology used for prospecting.
The prospect model works on the assumption that
both parties to the bio-prospecting deal are working to
maximize their financial prospects by exploiting the
resources beneficially in the market. The model’s
focus is not what is needed to keep the community
(or the government, as the case is) happy but on the
need of biodiversity materials to the prospector. Thus,
negotiated royalty is independent of the levels of
economic and/or social development of indigenous
communities at the time of negotiations. Otherwise,
bio-prospectors easily satisfy communities by
building schools, a few roads or throwing community
development ‘crumbs’ while carefully ensuring that
billion dollar returns that keep investors happy
are not disturbed.
The advantage of the model is that it eliminates
deficiencies of the current models where only the
prospector benefits from highest market price if the
drug is successful. Under the prospect model, the
negotiated price of the biodiversity can fluctuate
upward based on the success or the failure of the
compound. 35 By forcing prospecting company to
provide data on screening programmes, expected
levels of success in each stage of research and
information about the on-going research,35 both
parties would benefit if the drug is successful relative
to the extent of involvement.
Information Based Model

A more sophisticated version of the prospect model
is on the lines proposed by Anthony Artuso. 35 Under
this model, royalty payment would be streamlined
depending on the outcomes of each stage of test
result, thus generating a continuous range of values
for both parties.35 The prospector would be required
to initially negotiate based on a prediction of the rate
of success of the prospecting effort and typology of
information that may be generated. 35 Further tests or
trials performed over the compound would be like
purchasing a call option. 35 If the results meet the
expectations, then the increase in need for the
biodiversity material proportionally increases the
value of the option to proceed with further research
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and development increases.35 If the results are
unsuccessful, value of return diminishes thereby
affecting the option to go forward. 35 The benefit of
this model is that it forces the ‘researcher to think
more systematically about the correlation between test
results of compounds in consecutive phases’.35
Further, in reassessing the need for biodiversity
repeatedly, it provides an expected value for the
compound at every stage of research and
development. Notably, Artuso highlights that the
model is focused more on pharmaceutical research
and development. Perhaps, bio-values can be
evaluated similarly depending on data like the type of
research and type of knowledge that quickened a
particular research phases.
Contract Based Model

The contract model which can be worked alongside
the other models essentially recognizes that more
information would help streamline negotiating
mechanism. The model wor ks on the assumption that,
first, developing nations are committed towards
biodiversity preservation and the local communities.
Second, in order to fully benefit, developing countries
should appreciate that bio-prospecting is a rigorous
and risky process. Considering the risks involved, the
prospector is usually unable to predict success when
they enter into bioprospecting agreements. Similarly,
return to the prospector is not immediate. Therefore,
biodiversity rich countries are bound to create lowreturns for themselves when they negotiate a total
return payment at the beginning of prospecting
venture without any connection to the level of
success, like how it is currently done. Hence, the need
for biodiversity holders to negotiate returns that takes
into account risks and needs at every stage of the
development process. In essence, this model lends
information (like, disclosure requirements) that works
the other models more efficiently by taking account of
the increased value from the need.
Bio-prospecting agreements should incorporate
four standard terms. They are: (a) allocation of funds
towards biodiversity conservation, (b) allocation of
funds towards community development of the
locals that provide valuable information, (c) IP
sharing/ownership and (d) local manufacturing
requirement. The first two heads should be negotiated
in return for the initial access to the genetic resources.
The success of the initial testing creates a higher value
(and need) which serves as the basis for the terms

relating to sharing of IP and incorporating a local
manufacturing requirement which can result in
transfer of technology and sustainable development,
as envisaged in the Article 16-19 of the CBD.With
respect to IPR, communities can share rights in IPs
under different heads. IP may also be transferred from
use of the name as trademark, or as part of
geographical indicator of the resulting product.
Communities that provide information about biogenetic resources can share relative to the extent of
their involvement, a portion of worldwide royalties on
sales or, under some circumstances, become joint
patent holders. Once the heads for sharing IP are
determined, communities can structure several
options to generate returns. Thus, communities can
seek specific infrastructural changes, or stagger
royalty percentage with sales. That is, developing
country would become eligible for ‘x%’ of royalty
over the first 50 million dollars of sales and ‘y%’ over
the next 50 million dollars of sales. Thus, it is
important to create a mechanism to continually
generate the value from need. The resulting
information will result in awareness and lead to
discussions within indigenous communities, which
can ultimately translate into beneficial negotiations.
Similarly, with respect to the local working
requirement, biodiversity resources can be
strategically exploited to attract foreign direct
investments. Thus, bio-prospecting agreements can
include a training component or include a provision to
funds for training local scientists and/or to set up local
manufacturing or research facilities. After all,
developing countries became signatories of the trade
agenda in the expectation of foreign direct
investment. Including a local manufacturing
requirement in bio-prospecting agreements would
reduce the adverse effects developing countries suffer
from national treatment TRIPS which forbids
discrimination on the basis of place of manufacture.36
In order for the model to work more efficiently, the
Governing Body of the CBD should assume a more
active role in encouraging such agreements. The
Governing Body of the CBD can constitute an
advisory body - An Expert Advisory Committee
(EAC) - to assist developing countries at different
levels of the biodiversity pyramid to negotiate
favorable bioprospecting agreements. Such a body
can assist member states in their expert capacity
regarding the bio-prospecting negotiations in the
following manner 37 :

RAGAVAN: NEW PARADIGMS FOR PROTECTION OF BIODIVERSITY

(a) EAC can issue advisory opinions to member
states regarding bio-prospecting negotiations.
The advisory opinions can highlight different
terms that developing countries should include
in the negotiations. It can also outline various
options to structure royalty terms. Negotiating a
bio-prospecting agreement is difficult because
biodiversity resources do not fall within clear
ownership of any one person or group in
particular.38 The advisory body can be helpful in
highlighting various options to negotiators, be it
the government representatives or community
representatives and to understand the
ramifications of bio-prospecting arrangements.38
(b) EAC can provide guidelines as part of its duty to
help developing countries appreciate the issues
that might be involved in such negotiations. The
Bonn Guidelines, for instance, serve as a useful
tool for members to legislate national laws on
Access and Benefit Sharing. 37 Similarly,
guidelines can be issued on various aspects like
sharing IP, creating local working and
determining the extent of community
involvement.
The EAC’s work in itself can create a library of
information, drawing lessons from steps that other
countries have taken steps to facilitate fair exchange
of genetic and technological resources.
Conclusion
It is economically unfeasible for developed
countries and the big pharmaceutical companies to
demand low -cost access to biodiversity and respect
for IPR from developing nations. Respecting local
rights can be the first step to nurture respect for IPR.
Developing countries should ensure that the trilogy of
objectives - protection of biodiversity, sustainable
development, and equitable sharing of resources work in tandem with trade objectives.
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